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Summary
On October 9, 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test, with a yield of under
1 kiloton (vice the anticipated 4-kiloton yield) .  The United States and other countries
condemned the test and the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1718 on October
14, which requires North Korea to refrain from nuclear or missile tests, rejoin the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and dismantle its WMD programs.  The test is
the latest provocative act of many since 2002, when North Korea ended an eight-year
freeze on its plutonium production program, expelled international inspectors and
restarted facilities.  North Korea may now have enough Pu for eight to ten weapons,
having continued its production throughout the fits and starts of the Six-Party Talks.
This report will be updated as needed.
Background
In the early1980s, U.S. satellites tracked a growing indigenous nuclear program in
North Korea.  A small nuclear reactor at Yongbyon (5MWe), capable of producing about
6kg of plutonium per year, began operating in 1986.1  Later that year, U.S. satellites
detected high explosives testing and a new plant to separate plutonium.  In addition,
construction of two larger reactors (50MWe at Yongbyon and 200MWe at Taechon)
added to evidence of a serious clandestine effort.  Although North Korea had joined the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1985, the safeguards inspections that began only in
1992 raised questions about how much plutonium North Korea had produced covertly.
In 1994, North Korea pledged, under the Agreed Framework with the United States, to
freeze its plutonium programs and eventually dismantle them in return for several kinds
of assistance.2  At that time, Western intelligence agencies estimated that North Korea had
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separated enough plutonium for one or two bombs; other sources estimated four to five
bombs.
Weapons Production Milestones
Acquiring fissile material — plutonium-239 or highly enriched uranium (HEU) —
is the key hurdle in nuclear weapons development.3  Producing these two materials is
technically challenging; in comparison, many experts believe weaponization to be
relatively easy.4  North Korea has industrial-scale uranium mining, and plants for milling,
refining, and converting uranium; it also has a fuel fabrication plant, a nuclear reactor, and
a reprocessing plant — in short, everything needed to produce Pu-239.  In its nuclear
reactor, North Korea uses magnox fuel — natural uranium (>99%U-238) metal, wrapped
in  magnesium-alloy cladding.  About 8000 fuel rods constitute a fuel core for the reactor.
When irradiated in a reactor, natural uranium fuel absorbs a neutron and then decays
into plutonium (Pu-239).  Fuel that remains in the reactor for a long time becomes
contaminated by the isotope Pu-240, which can “poison” the functioning of a nuclear
weapon.5  Spent or irradiated fuel, which poses radiological hazards, must cool after
removal from the reactor.  The cooling phase, estimated by some at five months, is
proportional to the fuel burn-up.  Reprocessing to separate plutonium from waste products
and uranium is the next step.   North Korea uses a PUREX separation  process, like the
United States.  After shearing off the fuel cladding, the fuel is dissolved in nitric acid.
Components (plutonium, uranium, waste) of the fuel are separated into different streams
using organic solvents.  In small quantities, separation can be done in hot cells, but larger
quantities require significant shielding to prevent deadly exposure to radiation.6 
North Korea appears to have mastered the engineering requirements of plutonium
production.  Its 5MWe nuclear reactor operated from 1986 to 1994, restarting in January
2003.  North Korean officials claimed to have separated plutonium in hot cells and tested
the reprocessing plant in 1990, and to have reprocessed all 8000 fuel rods from the 5MWe
reactor between January and June 2003.  The January 2004 unofficial U.S. delegation
reported that “All indications from the display in the control room are that the reactor is
operating smoothly now....However, we have no way of assessing independently how well
the reactor has operated during the past year.”7  The same delegation reported that the
reprocessing “facility appeared in good repair,” in contrast to a 1992 IAEA assessment
of the reprocessing plant as “extremely primitive.”  In the end, however, significant
growth in North Korea’s arsenal depends on the completion of the two larger reactors and
progress in the reported uranium enrichment program. 
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In January 2004, North Korean officials showed an unofficial U.S. delegation
alloyed “scrap” from a plutonium (Pu) casting operation.  Alloying plutonium with other
materials is “common in plutonium metallurgy to retain the delta-phase of plutonium,
which makes it easier to cast and shape” (two steps in weapons production).8  Dr.
Siegfried Hecker, a delegation member, assessed that the stated density of the material
was consistent with plutonium alloyed with gallium or aluminum.  If so, this could
indicate a certain sophistication in North Korea’s handling of Pu metal, but without
testing the material, Hecker could not confirm that the metal was plutonium or that it was
alloyed, or that it was from the most recent reprocessing campaign.
There is no reliable information on North Korean nuclear weapons design.  Although
the U.S. Director of National Intelligence confirmed that a nuclear test was conducted on
October 9 in the vicinity of P’unggye, the sub-kiloton yield of the test suggests that the
weapon design or manufacturing process likely needs improvement.9  Environmental
clues suggest that the device used plutonium. By comparison, a simple plutonium
implosion device normally would produce a larger blast, perhaps 5 to 20 kilotons.  The
first nuclear tests conducted by other states range from 9 kt (Pakistan) to 60kt, but tests
by the United States, China, Britain and Russia were in the 20kt-range.  Implosion
devices, which use sophisticated lenses of high explosives to compress fissile material,
are generally thought to require testing, although the CIA suggested in 2003 that North
Korea could validate its weapons design using extensive high explosives testing.10   It is
possible that Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan may have provided North Korea the same
Chinese-origin nuclear weapon design he provided to Libya.  If so, this might help North
Korea develop a reliable warhead for ballistic missiles -- small, light and robust enough
to tolerate the extreme conditions encountered through a ballistic trajectory. Although
former DIA Director Jacoby told the Senate Armed Services Committee in April 2005
that North Korea had the capability to arm a missile with a nuclear device, Pentagon
officials later backtracked from that assessment.
 Estimating Nuclear Material Production
Most estimates of nuclear weapon stockpiles are based on estimated fissile material
production.  Factors in plutonium production include the average power level of the
reactor; days of operation; how much of the fuel is reprocessed and how quickly, and how
much plutonium is lost in production processes.  According to North Korea, the 5MWe
reactor performed poorly early on, unevenly irradiating the rods.  There is no data on the
reactor’s current performance or the reprocessing facility’s efficiency.  North Korea told
the IAEA that during the 1990 “hot test,” it lost almost 30% of the plutonium in the waste
streams.11  A key consideration is whether or not the reprocessing plant can run
continuously, since frequent shutdowns can lead to plutonium losses.  According to North
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Korean officials in January 2004, the plant annual throughput is 110 tons of spent fuel,
about twice the fuel load of the 5MWe reactor.  A final factor in assessing how many
weapons North Korea can produce is whether North Korea’s technical sophistication
enables it to use more or less material than the international standards of 8kg of Pu and
25kg for HEU per weapon.  North Korea’s abilities here are unknown.
What Does North Korea Have Now?
Secretary of State Powell stated in December 2002 that “We now believe they [North
Koreans] have a couple of nuclear weapons and have had them for years.”12  On February
10, 2005, North Korea announced that it had manufactured “nukes” for self-defense and
that it would bolster its nuclear weapons arsenal.13  In June 2005, Vice Foreign Minister
Kim Gye Gwan told ABC News that “We have enough nuclear bombs to defend against
a U.S. attack.  As for specifically how many we have, that is a secret.”  Kim also said
North Korea was building more bombs and when asked about delivery systems, said “our
scientists have the knowledge, comparable to other scientists around the world.”14  Some
Members of Congress interpreted CIA Director Porter Goss’ statements in March 2005
on a “range” of nuclear weapon estimates to confirm that North Korea’s arsenal has
multiplied.15  In December 2005, the North Korean foreign ministry stated that it would
“increase [its] self-reliant national defense capacity, including nuclear deterrent.”16  In
October 2006, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry said that  “nuclear weapons will serve as
[a] reliable war deterrent.”
Has North Korea reprocessed the existing spent fuel?.  On July 13, 2003,
North Korean officials told U.S. officials in New York that they had completed
reprocessing the 8000 fuel rods on June 30.17  On January 8, 2004, North Korean officials
told an unofficial U.S. delegation that the reprocessing campaign began in mid-January
2003 and ended at the end of June 2003.  In all, they reportedly reprocessed 50 tons of
spent fuel in less than six months, which tracks with earlier estimates that North Korea
could reprocess about 11 tons/month, roughly enough plutonium for one bomb per month.
An unofficial U.S. delegation in January 2004 concluded that the spent fuel pond no
longer held the 8,000 fuel rods and surmised that they could have been moved to another
storage location, but not without significant health and safety risks.  The delegation was
not allowed to visit the Dry Storage Building, where the fuel rods likely would have been
stored before reprocessing.  The delegation also did not visit waste facilities.
Reprocessing  the 8,000 fuel rods from the 5MWe reactor would yield between 25 and
30kg of plutonium, perhaps for four to six weapons, but the exact amount of plutonium
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that might have been reprocessed is unknown.  In 2004, North Korean officials stated that
the reprocessing campaign was conducted continuously (four 6-hour shifts).  U.S. efforts
to detect Krypton-85 (a by-product of reprocessing) reportedly suggested that some
reprocessing had taken place, but were largely inconclusive.  
Adding to the Arsenal
Make New Plutonium in 5MWe Reactor.  On February 6, 2003, North Korean
officials announced that the 5MWe reactor was operating, and commercial satellite
photography confirmed activity in March.  In January 2004, North Korean officials told
U.S. visitors that the reactor was now operating smoothly at 100% of its rated power.  The
U.S. visitors noted that the display in the reactor control room and steam plumes from the
cooling towers confirmed operation, but that there was no way of knowing how it had
operated over the last year.  In April 2005, the reactor was shut down, and on May 11,
2005, North Korean officials stated they harvested fuel rods for weapons.18  According
to commercial satellite images, the reactor resumed operations in August 2005.19
A common estimate is that the reactor generates 6 kg of Pu per year, roughly one
bomb per year, but the reactor would likely be operated for several years before fuel is
withdrawn.  One estimate is that the reactor held between 10 and 15 kg Pu in April 2005,
and that North Korea could have reprocessed all the fuel by mid-2006.20  From August
2005 to 2006, the reactor could have produced another 6 kg of Pu; in total, there could be
enough separated plutonium for another three weapons.
Complete Other Reactors.  The reactors at Yongbyon (50MWe) and Taechon
(200MWe) are likely several years from completion.  U.S. visitors in January 2004 saw
heavy corrosion and cracks in concrete building structures at Yongbyon, reporting that the
reactor building “looks in a terrible state of repair.”21  The CIA estimates that the two
reactors could generate about 275kg of plutonium per year.22  In August 2005, another
unofficial U.S. delegation to Pyongyang was told by North Korean officials that they
planned to finish building the 50MWe reactor within two years.  Commercial satellite
images in 2005 and 2006 show little progress.23
Produce Highly Enriched Uranium for Weapons.  A 2002 unclassified CIA
working paper on North Korea’s nuclear weapons and uranium enrichment estimated that
North Korea “is constructing a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium
for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational — which could be as
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soon as mid-decade.”24  Such a plant would need to produce more than 50kg of HEU per
year, requiring cascades of thousands of centrifuges.  The paper noted that in 2001, North
Korea “began seeking centrifuge-related materials in large quantities.”  The CIA has not
released any other unclassified statements on North Korea’s enrichment capabilities since
2002.  Pakistani President Musharraf revealed in his September 2006 memoir, In the Line
of Fire, that “Doctor A.Q. Khan transferred nearly two dozen P-1 and P-2 centrifuges to
North Korea.  He also provided North Korea with a flow meter, some special oils for
centrifuges, and coaching on centrifuge technology, including visits to top-secret
centrifuge plants.”25 However, the United States has not been able to confirm this directly
with Khan.
Centrifuge enrichment of uranium poses significant technical challenges, but may
offer a few advantages to North Korea.  Enrichment plants can be difficult to locate and
target, making them less vulnerable to military strikes than reactors or reprocessing plants,
and HEU also could give the North Koreans the option of producing either simpler
weapons (gun-assembly type) or more sophisticated weapons (using composite pits or
boosted fission techniques).  Although the HEU program might have been seen as a
bargaining chip in negotiations, it probably now no longer has that distinction.
How to Verify North Korean Claims?
Information about North Korea’s nuclear weapons production has depended on
remote monitoring and defector information, with mixed results.  Satellite images
correctly indicated the start-up of the 5MWe reactor, but gave no details about its
operations.  Satellites also detected trucks at Yongbyon in late January 2003, but could
not confirm the movement of spent fuel to the reprocessing plant;26 imagery reportedly
detected activity at the reprocessing plant in April 2003, but could not confirm large-scale
reprocessing;27 and, satellite imagery could not peer into an empty spent fuel pond, which
was shown to U.S. visitors in January 2004.  Even U.S. scientists visiting  Pyongyang in
January 2004 could not confirm North Korean claims of having reprocessed the spent fuel
or that the material shown was in fact plutonium.  Verifying those claims would require
greater access to the material and North Korean cooperation. This is particularly true in
the case of uranium enrichment; U.S. intelligence officials have said they do not know
where the uranium program is.  Although seismographs registered the October 9th
detonation, and environmental sampling has confirmed radioactivity, there is still no
information on what North Korea intended to accomplish with the test, from technical,
security, political, and diplomatic perspectives.  More data is necessary to project what
this “new” capability might mean for North Korea, the region, and the United States.
